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In Support of Huber
Jon F. Merz*
This is a review of two reviews of Peter Huber's GALILEO'S
REVENGE. 1 One (hereafter Nolan & Ursin), was recently published in
SCIENCE. 2 Another (hereafter Field), appeared in the last issue of
RISK. 3 These reviews beg for a response insofar as, in my
opinion,4 they miss Huber's point.
Opening the courts to any and all "experts," leaving it to the jury to
"sort it all out," leads to inconsistency and sometimes a miscarriage of
justice. Huber's fix is straight forward: He proposes more strict and
consistent judicial oversight of experts, whereby expert testimony is
limited to that "founded on theories, methods, and procedures 'generally
accepted' as valid among other scientists in the same field.' 5 As
Huber himself points out, some courts do get it right, but inconsistency
unnecessarily opens the door to injustice. As I view Huber's assertion,
it is that publication (or other peer review) of an expert's work should
be the benchmark of acceptability to the scientific community as well as
to the courts.
Because judges and juries generally are not able to assess the
scientific validity and integrity of research, external peer review should
be a gatekeeper for - or at least a measure of the weight to be accorded
- "expert" testimony. If an "expert" has sidestepped such quality
assurance, why should the courts pay heed?
* Dr. Merz is a lawyer and post-doctoral research fellow in Engineering and Public
Policy at Carnegie Mellon University.
1 HUBER, GA~uum's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
2 Nolan & Ursin, Science and Tort Law, 254 SCIENCE 1663 (December 13,
1991).
3 Field, 3 RISK 181 (1992).
4 See also, Merz, IEEE Spectrum, July, 1992, at 12 for a more thorough review.
5 HUBER, supra note 1, at 14.
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Field's criticism is that we need "more effective strategies for
demonstrating that such 'science' is... junk...." Peer review is available
to all who submit their work to leading journals, and it seems incumbent
upon all would-be experts to prove the scientific merit of their research.
Indeed, I would go so far as to presume the irrelevance of testimony not
supported by prior peer review and publication. While this may keep the
rare Galileo off the stand, it likewise prevents much-too-prevalent
pseudoscientists from receiving an imprimatur for stretching the limits
of scientific knowledge - and reality.
Surely, taking an agnostic approach to evidence does not promote
fairness and equity. Indeed, withholding potentially relevant evidence
from a jury, if "patronizing" in Field's view, is nonetheless common.
Unreliable, prejudicial or inflammatory evidence is generally withheld
from juries, and the scientific method, applicable to testimony
purporting to have empirical support, provides an unparalleled measure
of reliability.
Hand-waving avoidance of the issue is inadequate. Nolan & Ursin
state:6 "Juries are not required to, and often do not, believe the
plaintiff's witness...." The million dollar question is: How often is
"often?"' 7 The concept of fairness upon which our law is founded
requires that citizens be able to understand their legal obligations so that
they may behave accordingly. The fact that "junk science" may be relied
upon by the courts to delimit legal obligations can only make the law
more erratic and unpredictable. The plaintiffs' bar fully understands this:
The greater the uncertainty, the better the chances of getting to the jury
and the greater the chances of a favorable verdict.
Compensation for injury is apparently a sine qua non of "justice" in
Nolan & Ursin's eyes: 8 "In fact, the onerous requirements of
traditional tort law that plaintiff establish negligence and causation are
still very much in place in the broad array of tort cases outside the realm
of products liability, and even in that realm proving that a product is
6 Nolan & Ursin, 254 SCIENCE, at 1664.
7 Hakel, How Often is Often?, 23 AMER. PsYCHOL 533 (1968).
8 Nolan & Ursin, 254 ScIENcE, at 1663.
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defective is a complex, difficult, and costly task." First, I fail to see
what is so "onerous" in having to prove that someone committed a
wrong causing compensable injury before turning to them for damages.
Second, I do not understand their suggestion that causation is not
required in products liability cases - perhaps excepting the peculiar
version of "market share" liability adopted in New York.9 Finally, if
Nolan & Ursin think that it is difficult to prove that a marketed product
is defective, they should contemplate premarket difficulties faced by
engineers, manufacturers, sellers, and insurers, as well as their lawyers.
It is no simple matter to anticipate all the ways that consumers or
bystanders could be bludgeoned, impaled, strangled, burned or
poisoned - and to design, label, manufacture and sell functioning,
affordable products that avoid such risks.
Professors Nolan, Ursin and Field also take Dr. Huber to task for
relying on "macro-anecdotes." GALILEO'S REVENGE is based upon a
telling critique of "junk science" cases. These cases highlight situations
in Which people went to court and recovered damages from the
defendant despite the scientific fact that the defendant did not cause
plaintiff's injury. While Nolan & Ursin counter with their own
anecdote, it is fatal to both critiques that the reviewers do not present a
legal case in which a plaintiff recovered damages for an injury from a
defendant who only later was established as the cause of that injury by
peer reviewed science. 10
9 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d
1069 (1989).
10 Field asserts that the problem in some cases cited by Huber is the difference in
the scientific versus legal "burdens of proof." If I comprehend Field's assertion, it is
that a plaintiff suffering from cancer some 20 years following ingestion of aspirin
could bring in a witness to testify that aspirin "causes" cancer, citing a study that
shows a positive relationship between aspirin ingestion and cancer, with a p value of
up to 0.49. This is heresy. Research design of a study to find such a causal
relationship will try to control for as many causal and confounding factors as
possible. The p value is the probability that the relationship found is due to chance,
and the scientific "burden of proof" sets an admittedly arbitrary level (such as 0.05) to
avoid erroneous conclusions. Spurious "chance" relationships will always be found in
all research. The scientific method attempts to discriminate the real from the
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Huber is also criticized for failing to give the "legal system" credit,
citing the revelations of a cover-up in the case of the Dalkon Shield. Yet,
Huber points out that liability followed scientific findings of danger and
would have occurred regardless of the court's mistreatment of relevant
factual testimony. In no case did litigation precede, much less result in,
an advance in scientific knowledge. Are there any such cases? The quick
might point to breast implants, certainly a hot topic. While litigation may
have had a role in prompting the Food and Drug Administration to act,
implants are sure to pose few of the myriad risks postulated by
innumerable ambulance-chasers in advertisements fishing for potential
plaintiffs.
Finally, Nolan & Ursin show incomprehension of the scientific
method. Pointing to studies that indicate that as many as 1% of patients
are injured by physician malpractice, they assert that more, not less,
litigation is needed. It seems logical, but there is no empirical support,
e.g., controlled studies of hospitals and physicians operating under
different compensation laws, for this proposition. As Huber points out,
despite our litigiousness, we rank only in the middle of countries with
respect to safety. 11 Studies such as GALILEO'S REVENGE should be
promoted. Those arguing for and implementing ever-expansive common
law liability ought to have some empirical support for their grand
theories, however "logical." The courts should be open to feedback of
this nature, and if they refuse to evolve, then legislatures should act.
spurious, and the courts should attempt to achieve the same result in their "findings"
of facts. If the law has a "better" method than that of science for establishing facts,
then perhaps the legal method should be considered for broader application, such as in
the formulation of environmental and drug regulations. This is, of course, ridiculous,
inasmuch as regulatory policy would be driven by the flip of a coin. Why then
should the courts be any different? I leave further exploration of this troubling issue
to the future.
11 See also, THE LIABILrY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
IN oVAON (P.W. Huber & R.E. Litan, eds. 1991) (studying the impact of liability
law on safety and innovation in medical practice, in chemical and pharmaceutical
manufacture, and in the automotive and general aviation industries).
